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Consistent and Inconsistent Social Characteristics
and the
Determination of Power and Prestige Orders
It has long been known that previously established status character­
istics act as important determinants of the emergent power and prestige 
order in small task-oriented groups (see, for example, Torrance, 1957;
Katz, Goldston and Benjamin, 1958). Previous research specifically directed 
to this problem has shown that the resultant task behavior of the group 
members who are differentiated on a single status characteristic or eval­
uative dimension, external to the group's task, will reflect their relative 
states of this characteristic: group members with the highly evaluated 
state of the differentiating characteristic will exercise greater influence 
on the task outcome that those with the less highly evaluated state of the 
characteristic. This has been demonstrated to occur when the differen­
tiating characteristic is of a diffuse nature, such as educational level 
and military rank, whether or not this characteristic is initially rele­
vant to the group's task (Moore, 1968; Cohen, Berger and Zelditch, forth­
coming). It has also been demonstrated to occur when the differentiating 
characteristic is a specific social characteristic instrumental to the 
group's task (Berger and Conner, 1969).
In explaining these and related results, Berger and Conner (1969) 
argue that the members of task-oriented groups come to develop through 
time stable conceptions of the performance capacities of each other. These 
conceptions, or performance expectations, are beliefs about the relative 
task abilities of individuals that the members of the group come to hold. 
Typically these expectations will be differentiated; that is, they will 
be conceptions of inequalities in the task abilities of the group members.
- 2-
If differentiated, these performance expectations legitimate and determine 
differences in the power and prestige positions that develop in the group: 
inequalities in opportunities to perform, in performance rates, in evalu­
ations of members' contributions, and in the relative influence of the 
different members on the decisions of the group. In this sense the group's 
ordering of power and prestige positions is said to be a function of a 
structure of performance expectations its members come to hold. In the 
situation where the members of a task group are differentiated in terms 
of a diffuse status characteristic (age, sex, occupation, etc.), such 
differentiation provides a basis in terms of which these performance ex­
pectations are formed. That is, distinctions in task expectations come 
to coincide with the evaluational distinctions on the status characteris­
tic (Berger, Cohen and Zelditch, 1966). In the case where the members of 
a task group are differentiated in terms of a specific social characteris­
tic, task expectations are provided by the performance conceptions already 
associated with the social characteristic. Thus, through its relation to 
performance expectations, differentiating social characteristics (diffuse 
or specific) determine the ordering of power and prestige positions in 
the task-oriented group.*
An obvious extension of this line of research is to the problem of 
multi-characteristic status differentiation--that is, to the situation in 
which the members of the task-oriented group are differentiated on two or 
more social characteristics, each of which is instrumental to their task,
*For an application of the expectation argument to the situation where 
the members of the task-oriented group are not initially differentiated in 
terms of a specific or diffuse social characteristic, see Berger, Conner 
and McKeown (1968) and Fisek (1969).
־3-
and each of which carries information on expected performance capacities. 
The determination of power and prestige orders appears to be a straight­
forward matter when the distribution of two or more social character­
istics is consistent־־that is, when the members of the group possess sim­
ilarly evaulated states of the characteristics each of which is providing 
congruent information about an individual's performance capacities. In 
this case the power and prestige order of the group should be a direct 
function of the distribution of the states of the characteristics. The 
relationship between the group's power and prestige order and its differ­
entiating social characteristics appears much less clear, however, when 
the distribution of these characteristics is inconsistent. This is the 
situation where at least one of the members of the group possesses dis­
similarly evaluated states of the characteristics and these are providing 
incongruent or contradictory performance information, e.g., that an in­
dividual has "high" performance capacities and at the same time "low" 
performance capacities with respect to the group's task. Here we may ask 
how the actors cognitively define such inconsistencies, and what are the 
consequences of such definitions for their behavior in the group. This 
is the theoretical issue with which we are concerned. Putting the matter 
more generally, we may state our problem as follows: Given that the mem­
bers of a task-oriented group are differentiated on two or more socially 
valued characteristics instrumental to their task and which are allocated 
in a consistent or inconsistent manner, how will the members of such 
groups form performance expectations, and how will these expectations be 
related to the group's power and prestige order?
In the next section a theoretical structure is developed within which 
our problem is restated, and what appear to be at least two alternative 
answers are formulated. We then present an experiment designed to dis­
criminate between these alternatives, and then evaluate these theoretical 
alternatives in the light of our findings.
Theoretical Considerations
To facilitate our analysis of this problem we shall conceptualize 
it in terms of a simplified theoretical structure. Although this theo­
retical structure is simplified, we believe it contains those elements 
that are important and relevant to the processes with which we are con­
cerned.
We imagine a group containing two or more actors. However, we view 
the group from the point of view of one actor, say p. Strictly speaking, 
the other actors are objects of orientation to p. For purposes of exper­
imental study we confine our attention to two persons, p and o.
P and o are engaged in the solution of some task, which for simplicity 
we view as having only two outcomes, "success" or "failure." The task may 
be almost any kind of activity involving a series of contributions or 
problem solving attempts by one or more of the actors. Moreover, the 
members of the group are committed to the successful completion of the 
task, and it is both legitimate and crucial for them to take each other's 
behavior into account in order to achieve this outcome. In this sense, 
the group is "task focused," and its members are "collectively oriented" 
in solving their problem.
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We assume that there exist in this situation a number of specific 
social characteristics. A characteristic, C, is some aspect or property 
of an individual that might be used to describe him. For C to be a social 
characteristic, we require that it consist of at lefst two states which 
are differentially evaluated in terms of honor, esteem, desirability.
For C to be a specific social characteristic, specific performance ex­
pectations must be associated with its states. These are beliefs about 
how an individual possessing a given state of C will perform in defined 
or specified task situations. For example, mathematical ability may 
function as a specific social characteristic. We distinguish different 
levels of this characteristic, we associate differential social values 
to these levels (positive and negative), and we associate beliefs about 
the different performance capacities of individuals possessing the dif­
ferent states of the characteristic. Again for purposes of simplifying 
our analysis, we assume that there exist just two such characteristics 
in our situation, Cj and C 2 • Each characteristic involves two states 
that are differentially evaluated--one positively and the other negatively- 
and associated with these states are the beliefs that individuals posses­
sing them also possess, respectively, "high" and "low" performance capaci­
ties with respect to a task for which these characteristics are relevant.
In the situation of interest to us, we assume that it is given that p and 
o know that they are differentiated (possess different states) with respect 
to and C 2 > that these social characteristics are relevant to their task, 
and that they are of equal weight. Within this framework we can now 
consider how different distributions of the states of these social charac-
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teristics are related to different possible power and prestige orders 
that might emerge in the group.
The first case to be considered is that involving a consistent 
distribution of the states of the characteristics. Here the states of 
the characteristics possessed by each individual have the same or con­
sistent evaluations. That is, all positively evaluated states are posses­
sed by one individual, and all negatively evaluated states are possessed 
by the second. As already noted, this case would appear to present no new 
theoretical issues when compared with the situation in which there is a 
single characteristic (diffuse or specific) which differentiates the 
members of the group. We assume that given two or more differentiating 
social characteristics relevant to the group's task, if these character­
istics are allocated in a consistent manner, their effect on the group's 
power and prestige order will be similar to that of a single differentiating 
characteristic. The actor who possesses the positively evaluated states 
will hold a higher position on the power and prestige order than the actor 
who possesses the negatively evaluated states. The first individual will 
receive more action opportunities, make more performance outputs, be more 
likely to have these positively evaluated, and exercise more influence 
than the second individual.
The case where there is an inconsistent distribution of differentiating 
characteristics is considerably more complex. This is the situation where 
at least one of the group members, p or o, possesses states of the char­
acteristics that do not have consistent evaluations--for example, p 
possesses the positively evaluated state of and the negatively evalu­
ated state of C 2 • Here the actor has two bases for forming his performance
־7-
expectations, and these are providing contradictory information. The 
information provided by one characteristic is that p has a "high" perfor­
mance capacity relative to o on this task, while that conveyed by the 
second is that he has a "low" performance capacity relative to o on the 
task. We assume that p comes to cope with this problem, and that through 
the operation of some particular cognitive mechanism he comes to form 
performance expectations that enable him to effectively interact in the 
situation. Further, we assume that the cognitive mechanism that operates 
to determine the formation of performance expectations in this case will 
also be operative in the situation where the distribution of social char­
acteristics is consistent. Thus in determining which mechanism operates 
in the case of inconsistent distributions, we are trying to determine more 
generally how expectations will form in situations in which two or more 
social characteristics are task-significant.
On theoretical grounds, two alternative modes of cognitively defining 
the situation seem possible. The first, which we shall call a "balancing' 
mechanism, is based on some of the general ideas to be found in the lit­
erature on cognitive consistency theories (Heider, 1946; Newcomb, 1953). 
Applying this line of thinking to our problem, we reason that the actor p 
will tend to cognitively balance his situation so as to form performance 
expectations for self and other that correspond with a distribution of 
states of characteristics that is consistent or univalent for each individ­
ual. In the case where the distribution of the states of characteristics 
is such that each actor already possesses consistently or univalently 
evaluated states, p will form his expectations based on the actual distri­
bution of social characteristics. In the case where the distribution of
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social characteristics is inconsistent, p is expected to cognitively 
alter the situation. For example, if p possesses the positively eval­
uated state of Cj and the negatively evaluated state of C^» we might 
find him using only one of these social characteristics as the basis on 
which he forms his task expectations. Or, he might decide that the in­
formation regarding the inconsistent characteristics is erroneous, and 
that he in fact possesses states with similar evaluations. The particular 
manner of balancing the situation, such as the two just considered, is 
likely to depend upon the context of the specific situation. However, 
what is important is that according to this line of reasoning, the actor 
will form expectations that correspond to a perceived distribution of 
states that is consistent or univalent for each individual. Consequently, 
in terms of the conditions of our problem, where only two states are dis­
tinguished on C^ and C2> different distributions of these characteristics 
will result in p's forming one of two expectation states for self and 
other--either "high” or "low." Through the operation of the balancing 
mechanism, different distributions will be reduced to a unique balanced 
structure.*
The second mode of cognitively defining the situation that we con­
sider is one which we shall refer to as a "combining" mechanism. The ideas 
involved here are loosely associated with those from information and 
decision-making theories. According to this mechanism, the actor essen­
tially operates as an information processing system, taking into account
*More generally, this argument leads us to expect that the number of 
different expectation states p can form is limited to the number of dif­
ferentially evaluated states distinguished on the social characteristics 
possessed by the members of his group.
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all information available to him as regards the relevant social charac­
teristics and the task in the situation. Thus in forming expectations 
for self and other, p will use the information provided by both charac­
teristics. In a manner which we cannot as yet precisely describe, he 
will combine the performance information given by each of these charac­
teristics in forming resultant expectation states. In the case where p 
is confronted with a consistent distribution of equally weighted social 
characteristics, the resultant expectations that he forms will simply 
reflect the "high" and "low" performance conceptions associated with the 
states of these characteristics. In the case where p is confronted with 
an inconsistent distribution of these states--say, a group member has 
"high" performance capacity on and "low" on C 2 > the resultant expec­
tation he will form is for some state lying between "high" and "low": an 
"average" level state. Thus under this mechanism, the combined expecta­
tions that p will form for self and other can assume a large number of 
different values ranging from "high" to "low" and depending on the partic­
ular distribution of the characteristics in the situation.
Since there are no clearcut theoretical grounds to favor one or 
the other of these cognitive defining mechanisms, we have designed and 
conducted an experiment to enable us to discriminate between them. The 
experiment was designed to correspond with the simplified theoretical 
structure developed in this section.
The Experiment
The experimental situation consisted of two phases. In the first 
phase we created two specific social characteristics and assigned states
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of these characteristics to two subjects. In the second phase, we put 
the subjects in a standardized experimental situation where we could 
measure each subject's likelihood of being influenced by the other sub­
ject. This measure of influence was used as the indicator of the power and 
prestige position of the individual in the group.
Upon their arrival at the experimental laboratory, the subjects were 
led to separate rooms and given two written tests. These tests were de­
signed to establish two fictional abilities or specific social charac­
teristics on which the subjects could be differentiated. One test, 
called the "Meaning Insight Ability" test, was said to measure "meaning 
insight," a basic ability of the individual. This test contained 
fictional word association problems which involved matching an English 
word with the supposed phonetic spellings of two non-English words from 
a language unknown to the subjects. For each problem, the subject was 
asked to determine which of the two non-English words had the same 
meaning as the English word. The other test, called the ,,Relational 
Insight Ability" test, was said to measure "relational insight," another 
basic ability. This test also contained word association problems. These 
involved matching the supposed phonetic spelling of a Japanese word with 
two "ancient Japanese ideographs." For each problem, the subject was 
asked to determine which of the two ideographs had the same pronunciation 
as that given by the phonetic spelling, independent of their meanings.
Each of the tests contained twenty problems. Prior experience with these 
tests show them to be sufficiently vague and yet believable to enable the 
experimenter to induce a subject's belief and confidence in almost any 
score. Thus they provide an efficient means for creating and randomly
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assigning states of specific social characteristics.
Having completed the tests, the subjects were led to the experi­
mental room and seated in individual booths. Once seated, the apparent 
purpose of the experiment was explained. They were told th.it they would 
be working on a group decision-making task. The task, called a "Contrast 
Sensitivity” task, involved the visual judgment of a saries of slides.
Each slide consisted of two rectangular patterns, one i’.bove the other, 
and each pattern was composed of a different arrangement of small black 
and white squares. The problem, they were told, was to decide for each 
slide which of the two patterns, the top or the bottom, contained the 
greater area of white. Like the two ability tests, this task was also 
constructed to be ambiguous, so there were no right answers; both pat­
terns in each slide contained the same area of white. Previous stan­
dardization work with the task indicated that the actual probability of 
picking either pattern was approximately .5 for each slide (Ofshe and 
Simpson, forthcoming). To control for any lack of homogeneity between 
stimulus slides, the order of presentation was randomized by selecting 
a random starting stimulus for each group while the actual sequence was 
maintained from experiment to experiment.
The social characteristics were introduced by telling the subjects 
that since they would be working together as a group, it would be helpful 
for them to know as much as possible about each other. They were told 
that the purpose of the tests they had taken earlier was to provide them 
with this information. In order to establish relevance between the social 
characteristics and the task, Meaning Insight Ability and Relational 
Insight Ability were represented as being highly correlated with Contrast
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Sensitivity and with each other. They were told that people with high 
Meaning Insight and high Relational Insight ability usually do quite 
well on the Contrast Sensitivity problems, and people without these 
abilities usually do poorly. Furthermore, in an attempt to make the 
two abilities seem equally relevant, the tests themselves, in terms of 
their intrinsic properties, were constructed so as to be quite dissimilar 
from the Contrast Sensitivity task.
At this point the subjects' scores on the two tests were reported 
to them. The reporting of the scores was the main experimental manipu- 
lation--in fact, the only experimental manipulation which was used to 
create different conditions. We created three different conditions on 
the basis of the reported scores. Conditions I and II, which we desig­
nate as HH-LL and LL-HH (the first two letters indicate the states of 
C 1 and C£ that p possessed, and the last two letters indicate the states 
that o possessed), were run simultaneously. In each group one subject 
was assigned to the HH-LL condition and the other to the LL-HH condition. 
This assignment was random. In these groups the subjects were told that 
one of them (the subject assigned to the HH-LL condition) had gotten a 
score of 18 out of a possible 20 on the Meaning Insight Ability test 
and‘a score of 19 out of a possible 20 on the Relational Insight Ability 
test, while the other subject (the subject assigned to the LL-HH con­
dition) had gotten a score of 9 on the Meaning Insight Ability test and 
a score of 8 on the Relational Insight Ability test. These scores were 
interpreted for the subjects in terms of a chart of national standards.
A facsimile of this chart is reproduced in Figure 1 below. Thus the 
scores of the HH-LL subject were defined as superior scores, and the
scores of the LL-HH subject were defined as poor scores.
FIGURE 1
Test Standards
16 - 20 Superior 
11 15 ־ Average 
0 - 1 0  Poor
In Condition III, which we designate as HL-LH, both members of 
the group were given inconsistent score patterns. The scores reported 
showed that one of the subjects had scored 18 on the Meaning Insight 
Ability test and 9 on the Relational Insight Ability test, while the 
other subject had scored 8 on the Meaning Insight Ability test but had 
scored 19 on the Relational Insight Ability test. These scores were 
reported as being "unusual" to the subjects. The particular inconsistent 
score patterns were randomly assigned.
In performing the Contrast Sensitivity task, the procedure was 
for each subject to give an initial opinion of the correct answer, to 
be able to see the other person's initial opinion, and then to make a 
final decision. The subjects were told that this exchange of information 
on initial opinion was part of the group decision-making procedure and 
might be helpful to their own solutions of the problems. Actually, 
this exchange was controlled and was built into the experiment to pro­
vide the opportunity for exercising influence. All communication
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between the subjects occurred through the panels of an interaction 
control machine. One of these panels was located on each of the 
subjects' desks, and it allowed the subject to indicate his initial 
choice by pressing one of two buttons, to subsequently see the other 
person's initial choice on a signal light, and to indicate his final 
decision. These panels also allowed an experimental assistant in 
a separate room to control the information on the other person's 
choice. That is, the subjects could be made to see an agreeing or 
disagreeing initial choice from the other person independently of 
the other person's actual choice.
The experiment was run for twenty-five trials or Contrast 
Sensitivity slides. Twenty of these trials were controlled disagree­
ments or "critical" trials in which both subjects thought they were 
disagreeing with each other. The five agreement trials were also 
controlled; these were randomly distributed for each group, with 
one agreement included in each successive block of five trials. The 
reason for this high proportion of disagreements was to force the 
subjects to differentiate themselves on task performance.
After the experiment, the subjects were given a questionnaire 
to fill out. Upon completion of the questionnaire, they were taken 
to separate rooms and extensively interviewed. The purpose of the 
questionnaire and interview was to determine the effectiveness of the 
experimental manipulations and to gather information on the cognitive 
sets of the subjects at the end of the experiment.
A total of 91 subjects took part in the experiment. These were 
all male students from local junior colleges. They were recruited on
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a volunteer basis and were paid for their participation. Of the total 
number of subjects taking part in the experiment, 15 have been elim­
inated from the analysis of the results. These subjects were excluded 
for violating one or more of the initial conditions of the experiment, 
as determined in the post-experimental questionnaires and interviews. 
The following criteria were used as bases for exclusion:
1. Suspicion : If a subject became suspicious of any of the 
experimental manipulations he was eliminated from the sample. This 
category also included subjects who had previously read about decep­
tion experiments and thought the present experiment similar to them, 
and also subjects who had heard from others that the study involved 
deception.
2. Extraneous bases of differentiation between sub jects : If 
any particular set of circumstances provided a subject with a basis
of differentiation between himself and the other apart from the exper­
imental manipulation, then he was eliminated from the sample. Thus, 
all visible minority group members were eliminated from the sample. 
Previous acquaintance between the two group members also resulted in 
their being eliminated from the sample.
3. Failure of experimental manipulations : Subjects who were 
unable to understand the instructions, who were confused as to what 
was happening in the experiment and/or did not understand crucial 
parts of the instructions such as the relation of the tests to the 
Contrast Sensitivity task, were eliminated from the sample.
Of the total, 76 remained in the sample: 26 in the HH-LL con­
dition; 26 in the HL-LH condition; and 24 in the LL-HH condition.
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The predictions and results for these subjects are presented in the 
following section.
Predictions and Results
Our measure of an individual's power and prestige position was 
the rate at which he accepted influence, given a disagreement with 
other. This was operationalized as the proportion of "stay-responses" 
made by a subject over the twenty critical trials of the experiment.
A subject's response was coded as a ,,stay-response" if his final 
decision was the same as his initial choice, and was coded as a 
"change-response" if his final decision coincided with his partner's in­
itial choice. What are the specific predictions which follow from the 
balancing and combining arguments for the different conditions in 
this experiment?
The argument for the balancing mechanism for this situation is 
that all subjects will hold either high expectations for self and 
low for other, or low for self and high for other; and these will 
correspond with a perceived distribution of states of characteristics 
that is consistent or univalent for each individual. Power and 
prestige positions will then be directly determined by these expec­
tation structures. For subjects in the HH-LL or LL-HH conditions 
consistent distributions of states of characteristics are already 
given for each individual in the situation. The expectation structures 
which respectively correspond to these distributions are high-self, 
low-other and low-self, high-other. Consequently, we would expect 
subjects in the HH-LL condition to be less influenced and thus have
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a higher rate of stay-responses than subjects in the LL-HH condition.
If the balancing argument is correct, subjects in the HL-LH condition 
would also form expectations that correspond to a perceived distribu­
tion of states of characteristics that is consistent or univalent to 
each individual. For this to occur, these subjects would either 
select only one of the characteristics as a basis for their expecta­
tions or by cognitive distortion perceive the characteristic states 
possessed by each individual as having the same value. In either 
event, individual subjects in this condition would form either high- 
self, low-other or low-self, high-other expectation structures. Thus 
we would expect individual subjects in the HL-LH condition to have a 
rate of stay-responses similar to subjects in either the HH-LL or the 
LL-HH condition. Ideally, if the balancing mechanism were also 
operating in a uniform manner for the HL-LH subjects, we should find 
the overall proportion in the inconsistent condition approximating 
the proportions in one of the two consistent conditions. However, 
since this may not be true, and we have no way of predicting the 
direction of the cognitive balance taken by inconsistent subjects-- 
either to forming high-self, low-other or low-self, high-other expec­
tation structures--we might find the overall proportion of stay- 
responses in the inconsistent condition diverging from the proportions 
in the consistent conditions. To the extent that the divergence occurs, 
however, we would definitely expect to find bi-modality--that is, some 
subjects with response rates similar to the HH-LL subjects, and others 
with response rates similar to the LL-HH subjects.
For the multi-characteristic situations in which the distribution
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of states is consistent, HH-LL and LL-HH, the combining mechanism 
argument leads to the same predictions as those of the balancing 
mechanism. Under the assumptions of this argument, the individual 
uses all the information available concerning the distribution of 
states of characteristics in forming expectation states for self 
and other. These expectation states are an "average" or some com­
bining function of states of characteristics he and the other possess. 
Thus in the situation where the information conveyed to the individual 
is that he is high on two equally weighted characteristics and the 
other is low on these characteristics, the HH-LL condition, the 
individual is expected to form a high-self, low-other expectation 
structure. Similarly, under this argument the individual in the 
LL-HH condition is expected to form low-self, high-other expectations. 
Again assuming that the individual’s power and prestige position 
is a direct function of his expectation structure, we expect to find 
a higher rate of stay-responses for individuals in the HH-LL con­
dition as compared to those in the LL-HH condition. However, for 
subjects in the HL-LH condition, the predictions from the combining 
mechanism argument are markedly different from those we were led 
to by the balancing mechanism argument. In this condition subjects 
are expected to form expectation states that combine the information 
that they are high on one characteristic and low on a second equally 
weighted characteristic. The result is that the subject holds ex­
pectations for an "average" performance level relative to the task-- 
somewhere between high and low. Therefore, the expectation structure 
for subjects in this condition should be "average" for self and
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"average" for other. Again assuming that the individual's power and 
prestige position is a direct function of his expectation structure, 
this argument leads us to expect that the overall proportion of stay- 
responses for these subjects will be markedly different from those in 
the HH-LL or LL-HH conditions, and in fact should be in between the 
rates in these conditions. Further, this line of reasoning leads us 
to expect that the distribution of the number of stay-responses per 
subject should be uni-modal and similar to the distributions in the 
other two conditions. In short, the combining argument predicts that 
the HL-LH condition will be characterized by a rate of stay-responses 
that is peculiar to itself.
The experimental results are presented in Table 1. This table 
shows the proportions, mean number of stay-responses, and variances 
for subjects in each of the three conditions.
Table 1 about here
To begin with, it is to be observed that the data presented 
provide clear support for the primary prediction, common to both 
the balancing and combining arguments, that the rate of stay-respon­
ses for subjects in the HH-LL condition will be greater that the 
rate of stay-responses for subjects in the LL-HH condition. The 
actual proportion of stay-responses averaged for all subjects in 
the HH-LL condition is 0.82, as compared to 0.53 for subjects in 
the LL-HH condition. The difference is strikingly large. Application 
of the Mann-Whitney U test gives the probability of obtaining this 
difference on the basis of chance alone as considerably less than
Proportion, Mean Number of Stay-Responses, and Variance
Table 1
Number of Stay-Responses
Condition Subjects Proportion Mean Variance
HH-LL 26 .821 16.42 4.73
HL-LH 26 .661 13.23 5.62
LL-HH 24 .533 10.67 10.23
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.001, as reported in the first row of Table 2. It seems reasonable 
to conclude that when the distribution of states of two specific 
social characteristics is consistent, this distribution tends to 
order the power and prestige structure of the group such that the 
actor who possesses the highly evaluated states of the character­
istics is less likely to accept influence than the actor who pos­
sesses the less highly evaluated states of the characteristics.
Table 2 about here
Secondly, it is to be observed that the proportion of stay- 
responses for the subjects in the HL-LH condition is 0.66. This 
value is almost exactly in the middle of the spread between the 
values ־for the HH-LL and the LL-HH conditions. Applying the 
Mann-Whitney U test to the differences between the HL-LH condition 
and the HH-LL condition, we get the result reported in the second 
row of Table 2--that the likelihood of obtaining this difference 
on the basis of chance alone is considerably less than .001. Ap­
plication of the same test to the difference between the HL-LH and 
the LL-HH condition yields the result that the obtained difference 
could have been produced by chance alone with a probability of less 
than .05. There seems to be little question that the HL-LH con­
dition produces a different rate of stay-responses than either the 
HH-LL or the LL-HH conditions. These results are fully consistent with
the predictions from the combining mechanism argument: that the rate of 
accepting influence for subjects in the inconsistent condition will
Table 2
Results of Mann-Whitney U Test 
Applied to Differences Between Conditions
Conditions _____________Test Statistics
Tested U Z
.00003
.00005
.02270
5.068
3.923
2.805
HH-LL vs. LL-HH 27.0
HH-LL vs. HL-LH 87.5
LL-HH vs. HL-LH !23.0
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differ markedly from the rates of either of the. consistent conditions 
and that this rate in fact will be in between the rates of the 
other two conditions.
This analysis, however, does not completely eliminate the 
balancing mechanism argument. This argument admits the possibility 
that the direction of cognitive balance may not be uniform and that 
some subjects in this condition may balance in the direction of 
forming high-self, low-other expectations while others balance in 
the direction of forming low-self, high-other states. If this 
occurred, the resultant mean proportion of stay-responses for these 
different types of subjects could turn out to be an average of the 
rates found in the consistent conditions. However, if this did 
occur, there should be evidence for it in the distributions of stay- 
responses in the inconsistent conditions.
Looking at the variance of the number of stay-responses, as 
reported in the fourth column of Table 1, we see that the variance 
for the HL-LH condition is 5.62. Although this value is larger 
than that for the HH-LL condition, which is 4.73, this difference 
cannot be considered striking. Indeed, comparing the variance of 
the HL-LH condition with that of the LL-HH condition, which is 
10.23, we see that it is considerably less than that obtained for 
this particular consistent condition. In order to examine additional 
data relevant to this problem, we present in Table 3 the frequency 
distribution of the number of stay-responses for all three conditions
Table 3 about here
Table 3
The Frequency Distributions of the 
Number of Stay-Responses Per Subject
Number of
Stay-Responses HH-LL HL-LH LL-HH
4 X
5
6 X
7 X XXXX
8 X
9 X
10 X X
11 XXX xxxxx
12 XX xxxxxx XXX
13 x XXX XX
14 x xxxx XX
15 xxxxx xxxx XX
16 XX XX X
17 xxxxxxx X
18 xxxx X
19 XX
20 XX
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Examining the data for subjects in the HL-LH case, we find no 
indications of bi-modality in this distribution. As a matter of 
fact, the distribution for the HL-LH case and the distribution for 
the HH-LL case look remarkably similar. The only change between 
the conditions seems to be a linear transformation of the mean.*
Thus we find no support for the argument that the observed rate of 
stay-responses is due to an. aggregation across two populations of 
subjects balancing in different directions.
We conclude that the data obtained from this experiment clearly 
favor the combining mechanism argument. The subjects of this exper­
iment do indeed seem to be operating on the information given to 
them about the states of the specific social characteristics each 
of them possesses־ in forming task expectations for self and other in 
such a way as to use and combine all the information that is avail­
able to them. Thus in the case where the distribution of the states 
of the characteristics is inconsistent they tend to combine the 
states of the two characteristics so as to form "average" states.
There is one point worth noting as regards the generality of 
this conclusion. The inconsistent case we have investigated is 
both inconsistent and "symmetric." It is symmetric in the sense 
that looking at each actor separately we find that he possesses one
*Since all the subjects in the LL-HH condition were placed in 
a consistent low state to begin with, the relatively high variance 
in this condition cannot be taken as evidence for the balancing mech­
anism argument insofar as it applies to the problem of multiple char­
acteristics. Rather, this high variance is believed to reflect the 
tension and resulting unstable behavior produced by the cumulative 
effect of the two low ability manipulations employed in this condition.
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positively and one negatively evaluated state. Further, it is 
symmetric in the sense that the distributions for the two actors 
are "mirror images" of each other. It is conceivable that while 
the balancing mechanism does not operate in this case, it does 
operate where there already exists some status "edge" or advantage 
that provides a particular direction along which balancing can 
occur. Such a situation would be inconsistent and nonsymmetric: 
one in which all the group members do not possess a matched and 
equal number of positively and negatively evaluated states. We 
are at present conducting a study to determine what are the proper­
ties of emergent power and prestige orders in such situations.
Summary
We started our investigation with the problem: Given that the 
members of a task-oriented group are differentiated with respect 
to two or more social characteristics instrumental to their task, 
how is the distribution of these characteristics related to the 
group's power and prestige order? A theoretical analysis of this 
problem led us to the issue of how expectations are formed, and in 
particular how they are formed when the distribution of social 
characteristics is inconsistent. We have considered two alternative 
mechanisms which may be operating in the formation of expectations 
in multi-characteristic task situations. The first, which we have 
referred to as a balancing mechanism, postulates that the actor 
cognitively defines the situation so as to form expectation states 
that correspond with a perceived distribution of states of char­
acteristics that is consistent or univalent for each individual.
For the situation we considered, the operation of this mechanism 
would result in p's assigning one of two expectation states to 
self and to other--either "high" or "low." The second cognitive 
process we considered is one we have referred to as a combining 
mechanism. This postulates that the actor forms his expectations 
by combining or averaging the performance information contained in 
the states of the social characteristics possessed by self and 
other. For our situation of concern, the operation of this mech­
anism would result in p's assigning to self and to other one of a 
large number of different expectations ranging from "high" to "low" 
and depending upon the particular distribution of social character­
istics. In any event, once p has formed expectations, whether 
through the operation of a balancing or combining mechanism, his 
power and prestige position is assumed to be directly determined 
by his self-other expectation structure.
We designed and conducted a study, built around a standardized 
experimental situation, in an attempt to discriminate between the 
two alternative mechanisms. The study consisted of two phases, in 
the first of which we established and assigned the states of two 
specific social characteristics to two actors, who in the second 
phase were put in a standardized experimental situation where we 
could measure the power and prestige ordering that developed. The 
experiment consisted of three conditions: In the first condition 
(consistent), a subject who was high on both characteristics was 
paired with one who was low on both characteristics; in the second 
condition (consistent), a subject who was low on both characteristics
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was paired with one who was high on both characteristics; and in 
the third condition (inconsistent), a subject who was high on one 
characteristic but low on the second was paired with one who was 
low on the first characteristic and high on the second. The bal­
ancing and the combining mechanisms make different predictions as 
to the behavior of subjects in the third condition.
The results of our experiment clearly conform to the predictions 
made from the combining argument. The rate at which subjects in the 
inconsistent condition accepted influence was significantly differ­
ent from and in between the corresponding rates for subjects in 
the consistent conditions. It is also clear that this is not due 
to aggregating results over subjects who were behaving in radically 
different ways. We conclude that our experimental results strongly 
support the combining mechanism argument with the following reser­
vation: It may be that a situation involving a symmetric distri­
bution of characteristics is a special one with particular proper­
ties. We are now in the process of investigating this phenomenon 
in a situation involving non-symmetric distribution of the states 
of the characteristics in order to determine whether this is indeed 
the case.
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